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Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ( IPCC) , the UN scientific body for the study of climate evolution , has recently published the "Third Assessment Report" /1/ that contains the results of the simulations relevant to Global Warming. The graphics show the growing concentration of CO2 and of the average global heating within 2100 in connection with 7 different CO2 emission scenarios. (Fig. 1) The text does not give a clear explanation of this time limit, but probably the cause lies in the reliability problems of the complex simulations based on models of carbon cycle, hydrological cycle and climatic effects that show still some uncertainties.
To focus the attention of policymakers on the risks correlated to global heating, the "Summary for policymakers-WG1" stresses the calculated increases of global temperature within 2100. These ∆T vary from 2,0°C to 4,4°C depending on the chosen emission scenario. The maximum increase in temperature (4,4°C) is reached in the case of the scenario "fossil intensive "(F1FI) , but this scenario (that foresees at the end of the century a CO2 global emission equal to 4 times the current figure!) is considered unlikely, being related to the lack of global emissions rules for an entire century.
To assess the influence of the temperature increases in terms of global risks, one can read in the IPCC's Assessment Reports the description of the harmful effects that the climatic changes have on the biosphere. A recent report by UNEP (Nairobi, 5 th February 2001) states that the increase of the atmospheric disasters to be expected in the horizon 2050, in front of an average ∆T equal to 1,0÷1,5°C, could have an annual cost of 300 billion $ , whereas the annual cost of sanitary measures will increase by 30 billion $ in the USA and 21.9 billion $ in E.U. In 1990 the insurance cost of atmospheric disasters has been equal to 40 billion $.
Discussion about the IPCC results on Global Warming in TAR
In our opinion, the Summary's description of the Global Warming previsions does not appear to be suitable to induce a correct risk perception. This is confirmed by some facts. At opinion maker level, the simulation with ∆T=4,4°C is considered (hastenly) to present the greatest climatic risk, although it's relevant to an unlikely scenario. On the contrary, the fact that all simulations related to likely scenarios show, when extrapolated beyond 2100, higher ∆T values (corresponding to actual risks) is completely ignored.
These problems arise from the cut-off at 2100. As mentioned, from a purely scientific point of view, there are valid reasons to limit the simulations at a certain horizon. However, from the point of view of Kyoto negotiations, there are even more valid reasons that would advise a less "timid" attitude of IPCC.
Anyhow, the choice of the 2100 horizon appears to be not adequately justified.
It would certainly be more appropriate to produce in qualified scientific documents, such as the IPCC Assessment Reports (whose readers may correctly appreciate the discussion upon the uncertainties of the calculations), the time intervals subsequent to 2100 obtained from the best simulations performed with the most reliable physical models and most likely emission scenarios.
An example will clarify why this is advisable. Some preliminary simulations (described in Ref.
2) show in connection with the emission scenario denominated Heavy (which is intermediate among the IPCC scenarios shown in Fig.1bis ) that the CO2 concentration will continue to grow after 2100, reaching in about four centuries a peak between 1250 and 1340 ppm (Fig. 2) , while the global temperature increase (referred to now) will reach a peak of 8,2÷9,0°C.
For the already mentioned reasons, the calculated peaks are subject to marked uncertainties, so that, after the peak , the curves may have little significance. However, the graphic in Fig.2 has not been broken off in order to concretely show the influence of the two-hypothesis model of the ocean absorption.
The first part of the simulation, which is the more reliable, shows that the irreversible human damages (any severe damage should be considered irreversible from human standpoint if lasting for several centuries) will take place long before the peak temperature. unexpected climate changes on a regional scale. These changes may happen fairly quickly and last for a long time, bringing devastating consequences even during this century. Keeping this warning in mind, in the "gradual global warming" picture the irreversible damages will probably begin when the global ∆T will reach a value between 3° and 4°C.
To find an experimental support for this supposition, we are forced to come back to the glacial era.
In the Vostok ice core experiment, extending up to 420.000 years B.P. (Ref.4) , the global ∆T has never surpassed +3,2°C, i.e. the typical temperature peak of interglacial intervals (related to astronomic insolation peaks, according to the Milankovitch-Croll theory). During this time duration the CO2 concentration never exceeded the value of 285 ppm, insufficient to produce any detectable global heating.
To observe greater ∆T we are compelled to refer to the negative temperature trend, which reveals that ice polar cup expansion gave rise to an (irreversible) anthropic damage lasting for about 100.000 years, whose full expansion took place when ∆T reached a minimum of -9°C. This type of climate change is quite different from the presently arising one, but the human damages are probably equivalent.
The comparison of the above mentioned simulation with the IPCC results summarized in Fig.1 can be done by observing that the increase in temperature at year 2100 (i.e. 2,5°C, referred to now) is positioned within the intermediate ∆T. Therefore it is not a heavy-assumptions simulation.
Let us now consider a great intervention such as the safe storage of CO2 discharges, assuming that it will concern up to 30% of the global emission peak in the period 2070 -2080. This intervention has been simulated in Ref. 2 and is reported in Fig. 2bis .
If we limit the survey within 2100, the intervention results capable of reducing ∆T at the end of the century from 2,5°C to 2,3°C. But if we protract the simulation (assuming that the storage of CO2 discharges will continue after 2100 ) we will discover that the peak of temperature will decrease from 9,0°C to about 5,8°C.
It is clear that the risk abatement is much improved, expecially with respect to the period of lethal damages which took place under the peak conditions. Limiting the survey within 2100 appears then to be misleading.
In fact on the basis of the results within 2100, one would say that this intervention is practically useless.
On the contrary, long term results tell us that the biosphere would pass from certain destruction to the hope of recovery (by means of other suitable interventions such those analized in Ref. 7) ! It is, therefore, not exaggerated to say that the real negotiations on global heating will start when IPCC will decide to publish (with the necessary scientific caution) the results of simulations after 2100! Now let us try to understand, beyond the language of the simulations, the physical reasons why global heating becomes more insidious when the study its evolution shifts toward the long period.
The strong delay in reaching the temperature peak (at least 3 centuries), could induce us to believe that there is more time at our disposal for interventions. In reality, the delay is associated to an increase of the risk, because the further the peak moves away, the higher it becomes.
This characteristic of the carbon cycle on the biosphere can be explained by keeping in mind that, during the phase of increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, saturation phenomena gradually take place in the biological and physical processes that determine the absorption of CO2 in oceans. Then, under certain conditions, this absorption can diminish, giving rise to a delay in limiting the CO2 concentration.
How much CO2 can be discharged without compromising the biosphere?
The above general concepts permit a simple and effective evaluation of the risk when they are related with the experimental measures of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, that has grown from 315 ppm in 1958 to the current 370 ppm. Therefore one can try to answer the key question ("how much CO2 can still be emitted counting on ocean absorption?") only by using appropriate models.
From the survey of the preliminary simulations (Ref.
2) we can find that an average 63÷67% of the amount of CO2 that will be discharged from now to the peak (critical emission), will be absorbed by the oceans and therefore only about 1/3 will remain in the atmosphere, increasing the concentration accordingly.
Consequently, the maximum quantity of CO2 that we are allowed to emit without surpassing the above threshold equals about 1400 x 3 = 4200 Gt.
This notable increase in the receptive capacity of the biosphere is important, but not conclusive.
Critical emissions depend obviously on the type of scenario.
In Ref.2 a long-term scenario (named Timely) is considered that shows short-term energy consumptions (within 20 years) about 20% lower in comparison with today's most credited scenarios.
The emission curve of this scenario is rather low (Fig. 1bis) since it corresponds to an energy scenario which allows a sufficient economic development of the world population by using qualified low-carbon sources and low-energy technologies. But even in this scenario the critical emission of CO2 (approximately 9600 Gt!)
is too high if compared to the desired threshold. The causes can be found in the too slow diffusion of renewable sources and in the persistent use of fossil sources.
The CO2 concentration peak, which occurs in over 3 centuries (Fig 4) , is between 750 and 795 ppm.
Thus, to fall within the threshold of 550 ppm one must foresee additional specific interventions capable of halving the critical emission of the Timely scenario.
Keeping in mind that programs of global reforestation must be activated above all to restore the unbalanced hydrological cycle (increasing desertification, etc.), it appears also necessary to prepare an effective strategy in order to guarantee the future capacity of storing in safe ways an adequate fraction of globally discharged CO2. To give an idea of the proportions and costs of this world's strategy it is sufficient to remind that the CO2 that will have to be stored annually (in deplete gas wells, in acquiferous, etc.) is equal to 500÷600 times the quantity currently pumped in the USA in old wells to increase the retrievable oil fraction (programme
Enhanced Oil Recovery -EOR).
Beyond the problem of this global dimension, the problem of a fair distribution of the whole cost has to be solved as well. In the EOR programme no costs were involved, given the commercial convenience of the oil recovery. May the CO2 storage give rise to future useful applications ?
The evolution of Climatic Change and the Kyoto negotiations
Attention is normally focused on the main greenhouse gas (CO2) since it is currently responsible for 53% of Nevertheless, it is obvious that the study of the atmospheric evolution of all greenhouse gases is of great importance, as well as the most suitable interventions for reducing all their discharges.
The studies on the climatic changes performed by IPCC (and other scientific national and international bodies) proceed on a very vast front, but with a velocity that appears to be low if confronted with the urgency of establishing a strategy of global rules.
According to many scientists, it is necessary to go one step further that will enable to answer in good time the following question: "When finally a global strategy will be approved, there will be enough time to implement with success the proper interventions? "
One has to distinguish the scientific aspect of the problems (that request time and caution) from the decision making aspect linked to the Kyoto negotiation, for which the prime requirement is to know and evaluate the maximum level of risk that will affect the next generations.
Only in this way a correct response strategy can be formed.
Other doubts can arise from the fact that it has been suggested an adaptation strategy (may be in the long period) of humanity to the damaging effects of climatic change.
Since till now humanity is forcedly adapting itself to increasing desertification, extreme climate events and diffusion of tropical illnesses, the proposal of an adaptation strategy (which suggests the idea of "avoiding" the damages simply by adapting ourselves) has caused amazement in a time in which it is considered of high priority to define proper long term interventions, which must be activated in good time. -The A1 group Scenarios are relevant to the following conditions: moderate growth of world population (which peaks in the second part of the century), high economic development with energy consumes characterized by scenarios A1FI (fossil intensive), A1T (non-fossil energy sources), A1B (balance across all sources). -The B1 scenario assumes the same population as for A1 scenario, rapid change in economic structure toward a service and information economy with reduction in the material intensity and introduction of carbon free tecnologies. -The A2 scenario assumes a population increasing continously beyond 2100, economic development regionally oriented, slow technological growth. -In the B2 scenario the population is continously increasing (at a rate slower than A2 scenario), the economic development shows intermediate growth with slow technological changes. -The IS92a scenario is reported for comparison purposes from the Second Assessment Report. 
